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Abstract
When former General Motors chairman Charles "Engine Charlie" Wilson told Congress in 1952, "...what is
good for the country is good for General Motors, and what is good for General Motors is good for the
country" (Greenwald 45), he articulated the attitudes the American auto companies had about the economic
and social relationship between the United States and its automobile industry. That was true in 1952, but since
then American interests and those of its car manufacturers, have diverged significantly because of the auto
makers' single minded devotion to high short run profits and their inability to change quickly enough to meet
a dynamic consumer demand. Nowhere is this more evident than in an analysis of the rise of Japanese car
makers in the U.S. auto market, especially with respect to the Voluntary Export Restraint (VER).
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by Joshua Yount 
Introduction 
When former General Motors chairman Charles "Engine 
Charlie" Wilson told Congress in 1952, "...what is good for the 
country is good for General Motors, and what is good for General 
Motors is good for the country" (Greenwald 45), he articulated 
the attitudes the American auto companies had about the economic 
and social relationship between the United States and its 
automobile industry. That was true in 1952, but since then 
American interests and those of its car manufacturers, have 
diverged significantly because of the auto makers' single minded 
devotion to high short run profits and their inability to change 
quickly enough to meet a dynamic consumer demand. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in an analysis of the rise of Japanese car 
makers in the U.S. auto market, especially with respect to the 
Voluntary Export Restraint (VER). After U.S. auto makers missed 
the compact car boat in the 1970's, they came to the government 
on their hands and knees pointing to their balance sheets, 
uttering "Engine Charlie's" immortal words and begged for pro-
tection from competition. Still, they hadn't learned their 
lesson. After they got the VER, U.S. car makers grabbed the quick 
cash and only belatedly, with selective models, did they try to 
catch up with the Japanese. In the end, American auto makers and 
consumers paid, and are still paying the price of the 
consequences of the car companies' flawed approach to an 
automobile market. No longer engrossed in the tail fin, the 
approach is one based on dynamic efficiency, international 
competition, and high consumer expectations. 
History 
The late 1960's and 70's were not only a time of 
unprecedented political and social change, marking the loss of 
innocence for the baby boom generation, but also served as a time 
of change in international economics. Nowhere was that more 
evident than in the automobile industry. Starting in the late 
1960's and continuing through the entire decade of the 70's, the 
Japanese made serious inroads into the American automobile market 
by producing small, fuel efficient cars with an emphasis on 
quality. The initial success of Japanese producers in the U.S. 
automobile market rested on four factors, cited by Robert 
Crandall: the rise in oil prices created by the OPEC cartel's 
restriction of petroleum supply, the introduction of new federal 
safety and emissions regulations, the overall superior quality 
and longevity of Japanese cars, and the major cost advantages 
held by Japanese auto makers. First, the two oil shocks of the 
70's greatly inflated the price of gasoline, and in the land of 
"fuel efficient" cars like the Cadillac El Dorado and the Ford 
Thunderbird, the rise in the price of gasoline had a major effect 
Illinois Wesleyan University 19 
on American consumer income. The Japanese producers of the small, 
fuel efficient cars suddenly found themselves on the leading edge 
of consumer demand. Second, not only did American companies find 
themselves lagging behind in car styling, but because of new 
federal regulations, U.S. car makers were also lacking in safety 
and emissions control improvements, totaling approximately $1000 
a car. Third, Japanese cars had superior quality and needed fewer 
repairs. In fact, they were rated three to four times better than 
the cars the big three were producing in 1981. Finally, the 
reason most cited by experts and non-experts, and the most 
difficult to overcome for U.S. auto companies, was Japan's 
substantial and significant cost advantage due to lower 
comparative wages, greater productivity, smaller inventories, and 
a devalued yen matched with a strong dollar (8-11). 
These four factors proved disastrous for the American auto 
industry, which lost 10% of its market share in just five years 
to the Japanese (Collyns and Dunaway 152). The bad times came to 
a head in 1980 when all four auto makers posted combined losses 
of $4.2 billion, Chrysler was bailed out by the government, and 
American Motors was bought by Renault (Pomfret 57). In addition, 
there was a 39% unemployment rate in the American auto industry 
and among its suppliers (McGowan and Vaughn 416). In response, 
both Ford and the United Auto Workers filed petitions with the 
government requesting assistance. The U.S. International Trade 
Commission ruled that the U.S. car makers' inability to meet the 
consumer demand for small fuel efficient cars was the primary 
cause of their demise, not Japanese car makers. So instead of 
trade restrictions the Carter administration proposed an industry 
aid package. Trade restrictions were not far off, though. When 
Ronald Reagan took office, his administration launched the 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP), which enhanced Carter's aid 
package by providing tax relief, relaxing regulations, and 
pressuring the Japanese into proposing a Voluntary Export 
Restraint of 1.68 billion cars per year (McGowan and Vaughan 
416-17). Reagan hoped that these supposedly temporary measures 
would bolster domestic auto makers' sales, providing them with 
time to catch up with Japan on down-sizing, re-styling, fuel 
efficiency, quality, and productivity (Crandall 12). By following 
these steps, the expectation was that U.S. auto makers would 
recapture their lost market share and the U.S. economy would be 
able to regain 300,000 lost auto worker jobs (Pomfret 57). 
The Reagan administration continued to request the quota 
through March of 1985, with an increase to 1.85 million cars per 
year in 1984. Then, because of the reassurgence of the U.S. auto 
industry and the record profits posted by domestic producers, the 
U.S. did not request a continuation of the VER. Nevertheless, 
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) took 
the voluntary aspect of the agreement to heart and continued the 
quota system after raising the limit to 2.3 million cars per year 
(Omichi 49-50). MITI claimed to be continuing the VER to prevent 
anti-import feelings in the U.S. and thus continued the VER at 
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2.3 million cars per year until 1992 when the quota was cut back 
to 1.65 million as the U.S. auto industry once again faced hard 
times (Johnson 1). The effects of this most recent cut in the 
quota have yet to be registered, but reliable predictions can be 
made-from the observed effects on Japanese producers, U.S. 
producers, and U.S. consumers in the first ten years of the 
U.S.-Japan Voluntary Export Restraint. 
Effects on Japanese Producers 
It seems evident that the Voluntary Export Restraint has 
been beneficial to Japan if only because of MITI's insistence on 
maintaining the quota past 1985 when the U.S. stopped requesting 
its continuation. The reasons for MITI's continuation of the 
quota lie in the effects it has had on Japanese auto makers, some 
intended, many not. The first and most noticeable, as well as 
predicted effect of the VER on Japanese automobile exports, was 
the sudden and marked increase in price, $2825 per car in 1984 
alone (Collyns and Dunaway 162-5, 169). Dardis and Lin argue that 
the price increase can be attributed to the reduction in supply 
the quotas forced on Japanese auto makers (278-9)(Fig 1). After 
the VER was instituted the supply curve became SES' with P3 as 
the new higher price and Q3 as the new lower quantity. However, 
the rise in price due to a restriction in supply, known as the 
pure price effect, was not the only change in the automobile 
market, though. Another important factor affecting consumer 
choice and the prices of Japanese cars was the fundamental change 
in the types of cars sold by Japanese auto makers. The Japanese 
moved upscale to produce higher quality, more expensive cars 
because they could no longer sell as many cheap small cars as 
they wished in the U.S. (Dardis and Lin 278). In fact, Robert 
Feenestra estimates that Japanese cars improved quality-wise by 
30% between 1980 and 1985 (143). The upscale shift in product mix 
again alters the supply curve (Fig 3). The greater production 
costs of higher quality cars shifts the supply curve out to 
S'ES', with EF representing the cost of higher quality, CP2-P}) , 
known as the quality effect, section c, leaving section a, 
(P,- P2), to represent the pure price effect. Although the higher 
prices reduced sales by 1.5 million cars in 1984 (Q.,- Q3) , the 
increase in price more than compensated for the loss in revenue 
due to the loss in sales; producers gained sections a and c, and 
lost section b (Dardis and Lin 279-80). The exact amounts of 
these gains depend on the assumptions about the reactions of U.S. 
producers, who also raised price and improved quality. If the 
pure price effect is assumed to be equal between the producers of 
the two nations, then Japanese producers gained $1.00 billion in 
1984. On the other hand, if the quality effect was equal, then 
they gained $5.21 billion! (Collyns and Dunaway 166-9) (Table 1 
p.13). The likely result lies somewhere in between the two 
extremes, but the attractiveness of the quotas for Japanese auto 
makers is certainly evident. 
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Figure 1 Market for Japanese auto makers 
Market for Japanese auto makers Quality effects $I S' 
Besides price increases and quality improvement, the VER 

affected Japanese producers in many ways. Since the VER caused 

Japanese car prices to increase more than U.S. prices, price 

competition was no longer as viable a competitive strategy as it 

was prior to the VER. Consequently the Japanese turned to 

non-price sales efforts to maintain market share. Quality 

improvement was one important step. No longer solely producers of 

econo-boxes, Lermses and Acuras began to roll off Japanese auto 

makers8 production lines ("Goalsw 69). The second important 

non-price sales effort was advertising. After the VER was 

instituted in 1981, Japanese auto companies' advertising 

expenditures increased significantly in order to facilitate 

product differentiation by promoting new, higher quality models, 

and to increase brand admiration by fighting anti-import fever. 

Who can forget people jumping up and down about Toyotas, singing, 

"1 love what you do for me, Toyota!I1? These two steps kept 

Japanese companies from losing their entire market share and 

proved to make them stronger competitors in the long run. 

In addition to the strengthening effects on Japanese car makers 

of increased profits, quality, product differentiation, and brand 

admiration, Richard Pomfret describes two precedents set by the 

VER that greatly benefited the Japanese. The first was the trend 

that the VER set toward instituting anti-free trade agreements, 

subsequently followed by much of Europe and Canada. Because these 

VERs limited the supply of cars that could be exported, the 

profits that could be made exporting cars were squeezed (58-9). 

If the equation (P, equals the profits from 

-c Os -t)'k be able to grow significantly 
exporting, r,, protits will no 

because the quota fixes q,. This opens up foreign direct in- 

vestment as a more profita%le option, where (Pfdi -c) qfdi -Ffdi 

equals profits afdi (Martin 339-42). Cars built in the country 

they are sold in are not subject to a quota, therefore, profits 
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can grow. Aided by the small MES of Japanese auto plants, the 
Japanese set up shop in America through joint ventures in places 
like Freemont, California and Bloomington, Illinois, and alone in 
places like Marysville, Ohio and Smyrna, Tennessee (Omichi 50; 
Rice 22). This proved to be a very wise move because it helped 
spread risk for when the dollar weakened, as it did in 1985, and 
provided producers with a quota-free place to build cars (Martin 
339-42; Berger 61). The most helpful effect of the VER for 
Japanese producers was the de facto approval of a Japanese 
automobile producer cartel, by letting them limit quantity and 
drive up price, the same way OPEC drove up oil prices in the 
70's. The big problem for the U.S. was that it couldn't complain 
of the anti-competitive nature of MITI's setting of a quota and 
allocating market shares because the U.S. was the one who 
suggested the quota in the first place (Pomfret 58). These 
precedents are the lasting legacy of the VER and in the long run 
may be the VER's greatest cost to both the American auto industry 
and the U.S. economy. 
Although the VER was primarily instituted to make U.S. car 
manufacturers stronger, it was also hoped that, in turn, Japanese 
producers would be hurt. Yet besides an initial 7.5% drop in 
market share, that .was subsequently recovered, Japanese auto 
makers were not hurt at all. In fact, increased profits, improved 
quality, greater brand admiration, foreign direct investment, and 
a legal cartel seem to be the true effects on Japanese car 
companies of the same Voluntary Export Restraint that was 
supposed to save the American auto industry. 
Effects on U.S. Producers 
As with Japanese producers, the U.S. auto makers believed 
the VER to be beneficial because they felt that the VER 
compensated for the tax and currency advantages held by the 
Japanese, thus allowing American car companies to be competitive 
(Callahan and Williams 40; Iacocca 227-30; Fisher 21-3). Because 
the supply of Japanese cars was limited, their price rose 
significantly (figs 1 & 2), (table 1). In turn, this caused the 
demand for U.S. automobiles, a substitute, to rise, ultimately 
raising the price of American cars (Dardis and Lin 282-4) (fig 
3). The attractiveness of this policy can be seen by looking at 
the increase in revenue that results when demand shifts to D', 
price rises to p2, and quantity increases to q2, causing revenue 
to increase from p^ q.jB to p20q2A. In 1984, these market 
alterations caused domestic car prices to rise $1,187, and 
assuming equal pure price effects, $4.93 billion in transfers 
from consumers to producers occurred, versus $1.27 billion in 
transfers assuming equal quality effects (Collyns and Dunaway 
166-9) (table 2 p.13). 
Because domestic producers raised price less than the 
Japanese, their market share rose 6.75% in 1984, to leave U.S. 
produced car sales unaffected in the face of the industry wide 
decline in sales due to the across the board price hikes by all 
producers (Coughlin and Wood 39). Although sales did not change, 
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Figure 3 
Demand and supply for U.S. auto makers 
ql Q2 
profits reached record levels for all U.S. car makers, totaling 
$9.8 billion in 1984, for three primary reasons (Omicni 50). 
First, and most importantly, prices jumped $1,187 per car, which 
alone would have substantially increased profits. Second, and 
counter to the aims of the VER, automakers employed less labor 
per automobile because of the introduction of robots and 
automation into auto plants (Dardis and Lin 289). Third, the 
labor that U.S. auto makers did employ came cheaper than it did 
before, because each of the big three secured wage and benefits 
concessions from its workers (Crandall 13). 
Although retooling and reducing the number of workers 
necessary to build a car represent positive long run steps taken 
by American car manufacturers, for them it was a case of too 
little too late. For example, it was at least ten years before 
U.S. auto companies could offer up even a few truly competitive 
car models. Rather than investing more of their short run profits 
to quickly catch up with the Japanese on productivity, quality, 
and styling, auto executives purchased financial, aircraft, and 
computer companies, wrote books, headed monument restoration 
commissions, and gave themselves hefty bonuses for earning 
profits from a restrictive trade agreement. While American auto 
companies and their executives hid behind the VER counting their 
money, as the 80's went on, Japan and other nations improved 
their competitiveness and started to gain market share from the 
big three once again. For non-quota countries such as South 
Korea, the VER provided its car companies, like Hyundai, with an 
opportunity to sneak into the low end of the market and emulate 
Japan's low price strategies of the 1970's (Pomfret 58; Berger 
61). For Japan, strategies such as foreign direct investment and 
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increased sales efforts allowed them to whittle away at domestic 
producer market share. Overall it seems that the VER, in 
contradiction to what it originally intended to bring about, 
resulted in encouraging increased competition from abroad, while 
fostering foot dragging and complacency in Detroit. 
Effects on U.S. Consumers 
Both Japanese and American automobile manufacturers 
received benefits and absorbed costs from the Voluntary Export 
Restraint to greater and lesser degrees, but one group was 
fortunate enough to endure only one kind of result; that group 
being consumers and that result being monumental costs. The most 
obvious cost to consumers lies in the rise in price of both 
Japanese and American cars, totaling $1,649 per car in 1984, 
considering pure price and quality effects (Collyns and Dunaway 
161 3,166-9) (table 3 p.13). The per car cost translates into 
both transfers to producers and deadweight loss (fig 4) as prices 
rise from p1 to p2 because of the VER's reduction in consumer 
surplus. Section a represents a transfer from consumers to 
Figure 4 
Costs to U.S. consumers 
$ 
P2 
Pi 
q2 ql 
producers, which only considering pure price effects equaled 
$5.47 billion in 1984, and Section b represents the deadweight 
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loss, which under the same assumption, equaled $130 million in 
that year (Collyns and Dunaway 166-9). Many people, such as "free 
trader" Lee lacocca, would justify these costs by saying that 
even if it didn't create jobs, the VER saved jobs, for a while at 
least. Crandall and others estimate that the VER saved between 
40,000 and 75,000 jobs, at a cost of nearly $160,000 per job per 
year (Crandall 16; Coughlin and Wood 39). Although this may be 
far below Mr. lacocca's hefty salary, it would be an 
extraordinarily large paycheck for an auto worker. The VER surely 
must have seemed to be a fairly simple answer to the U.S. auto 
industry's woes back in 1981. Unfortunately for U.S. consumers no 
one was looking out for the woes this policy would inflict on 
them. Consequently, they paid the price. 
Conclusion 
In 1991 when President George Bush led a trade negotiation 
mission to Japan, bringing with him the heads of the big three 
U.S. auto makers, the true folly of the Voluntary Export 
Restraint became apparent. The U.S. auto makers, once again 
feeling the squeeze of a weak economy and competition from 
abroad, made a lot of noise about unfair competition and domestic 
content percentages. Their behavior stems from two possible 
causes: first, that U.S. auto makers pulled their favorite 
scapegoat out of the closet as they usually do when business 
turns sour, and second that the U.S. still lags behind Japan in 
productivity, styling, and quality. The true cause is probably a 
little of both, but since it seems that the U.S., after ten years 
of the VER, has not caught up with the Japanese, it would follow 
the VER has failed to achieve its objectives. In fact, if the 
effects on Japanese producers and consumers are considered, the 
VER failed miserably, leaving behind as its legacy a fiercely 
competitive Japanese automobile cartel, a complacent, excuse 
making American auto industry, and scores of consumers stung by 
artificially high car prices. The fact that the VER did not help 
the U.S. auto industry in the long run points to another reason 
for its existence. As Dardis and Lin suggest, the Voluntary 
Export Restraint was, and always will be a political measure 
enacted to placate workers and producers, not an economic 
solution to a deep-seeded problem of gross mismanagement and 
inability to meet consumer demand (290-1). 
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